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Table 1. Examples of lexical flexibility in English. 
 
Patterns and their Senses 
 
Examples 
Material for Artifact 
(glass, tin, iron, etc.) 
There is shattered glass on the street/ 
She poured beer into the glass  
Animal for Meat 
(chicken, turkey, fish, etc.) 
The chicken strutted through the coop/ 
The chicken was overcooked 
Object for Representational Content 
(book, magazine, DVD, etc.) 
The book is water damaged/ 
The book is very funny 
Container for Contents 
(pot, bowl, box, etc.) 
She cleaned the pot after dinner / 
She stirred the pot with a spoon 
Body Part for Object Part 
(leg, arm, back, etc.) 
He broke his leg last year / 
That table has a broken leg 
Artist for Product 
(Picasso, Camus, Mozart, etc.) 
Picasso was born in 1881 / 
That collection has a Picasso 
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Place for Institution 
(White House, Wall Street, City Hall, 
etc.) 
The White House is painted white / 
The White House released a statement 
Place for Event 
(Vietnam, Waterloo, Woodstock, etc.) 
Vietnam shares a border with China / 
He fought during Vietnam 
Substance for Placing Substance at Goal 
(butter, salt, water, etc.) 
He found some butter in the fridge/  
He is going to butter the toast 
Instrument for Action Involving 
Instrument 
(shovel, hammer, rake, etc.) 
She has a green shovel / 
She is going to shovel the snow 
	
	
Table	1	illustrates	a	number	of	ways	in	which	the	meanings	of	English	words	can	change	in	
context.	As	can	be	seen,	the	names	of	materials	are	used	to	describe	artifacts,	the	names	of	
artists	are	used	to	describe	their	works,	and	the	names	of	body	parts	are	used	to	describe	
parts	of	inanimate	objects.1			These	are	examples	of	phenomena	that	have	been	given	a	
variety	of	different	names	by	researchers,	including	polysemy,	systematic	polysemy,	
metonymy,	logical	metonymy,	coercion,	denominalization,	class	extension,	and	more.	Here,	
we	treat	these	different	phenomena	as	variants	on	a	single	theme,	as	examples	of	a	broader	
phenomenon	that	we	call	“lexical	flexibility”.	Rather	than	list	all	of	the	ways	that	a	word	can	
be	flexible,	our	focus	in	this	chapter	is	to	explain	the	core	organizational	characteristics	that,	
we	believe,	may	underlie	all	of	these	different	phenomena.	
	
To	do	this,	we	pose,	and	attempt	to	answer,	three	questions.	First,	is	lexical	flexibility	a	
structured	and	predictable	phenomenon,	and	how	does	this	structure	vary	across	
languages?	Second,	how	are	flexible	word	senses	represented	in	the	mental	lexicon?	Finally,	
we	speculate	on	a	somewhat	deeper	question:	why	do	languages	have	flexible	words	in	the	
first	place?		
	
1.	The	structure	of	lexical	flexibility	
	
Lexical	flexibility,	at	least	in	English,	has	two	key	characteristics.	First,	word	senses	appear	to	
fall	into	patterns,	such	that	words	from	similar	semantic	fields	exhibit	similar	flexibility	
(Table	1,	Apresjan,	1974;	Lehrer,	1990;	Nunberg,	1979;	Srinivasan	&	Rabagliati,	2015).	For	
example,	chicken,	lamb,	duck,	and	salmon	are	all	names	for	animals,	and	they	can	also	all	be	
used	to	name	the	meat	that	comes	from	those	animals.	Likewise,	words	for	substances	can	
also	be	used	to	label	objects	made	from	those	substances	(drinking	glass,	biscuit	tin,	clothes	
iron	etc.).	Second,	these	patterns	vary	in	how	freely	they	permit	generalization	(Apresjan,	
1974;	Copestake	&	Briscoe,	1995;	Srinivasan	&	Rabagliati,	2015).	In	particular,	for	some	
patterns,	word	meanings	can	be	extended	quite	freely.	Almost	any	name	for	an	animal	can	
be	extended	to	describe	its	meat;	This	holds	for	animals	that	are	not	typically	eaten	(John	
ate	stewed	wildebeest)	as	well	as	for	entirely	novel	examples	of	animals	(e.g.,	if	a	new	
species	of	animal,	the	wug	is	discovered,	it	would	be	natural	to	say	John	ate	wug	for	dinner).	
																																																						
1	Interestingly,	in	many	of	these	examples,	word	meanings	vary	alongside	syntactic	category:	Nouns	
and	verbs	often	share	a	common	root	(hammer,	water)	and	nouns	often	have	different	senses	when	
used	in	mass	(some	glass)	or	count	(a	glass)	syntax.	
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This	pattern	allows	generalization	in	much	the	same	way	as	a	productive	morphological	
alternation	does	(e.g.,	the	use	of	the	–ly	morpheme	in	sad/sadly),	and	like	these	
alternations,	it	also	permits	for	exceptions	(e.g.,	cow/beef)2.	However,	for	other	patterns,	
generalization	is	more	constrained.	While,	as	noted	above,	English	contains	many	instances	
where	a	name	for	a	substance	has	been	extended	to	describe	an	object,	this	pattern	of	
extension	is	not	productive.	For	example,	imagine	that	a	new	type	of	carbon	is	invented,	
called	wug;	it	may	not	be	immediately	natural	to	use	wug	to	describe	a	specific,	newly-
created	artifact	made	from	that	material.	
	
In	this	section,	we	aim	to	explain	these	two	features	of	lexical	flexibility:	i.e.,	why	word	
senses	cluster	in	patterns,	and	what	determines	whether	a	particular	pattern	is	productive.	
In	particular,	our	goal	is	to	understand	how	these	two	features	of	lexical	flexibility	can	be	
explained	by	conceptual	organization,	and	the	linguistic	conventions	that	facilitate	
communication.	
	
1.1	Explaining	patterns	of	flexibility	
	
“Conceptual”	explanations	of	patterns	of	flexibility	have	taken	a	variety	of	forms,	but	
perhaps	the	most	prominent	argument	is	that	patterns	of	flexibility	reflect	deep-set	
connections	between	different	types	of	concepts.	One	particular	example	of	this	approach	is	
Conceptual	Metaphor	Theory	(Lakoff	&	Johnson,	1980a,	1980b),	which	argues	that	concepts	
stand	in	asymmetric,	metaphorical	relations.	The	argument	from	Conceptual	Metaphor	
Theory,	in	brief,	is	that	certain	types	of	concepts	are	grounded	in	concrete,	sensorimotor	
experience	(e.g.,	our	perception	of	colour	allows	us	to	represent	the	concept	of	blue)	and	
“image	schemas”,	and	these	concrete	concepts	are	used	to	make	sense,	metaphorically,	of	
more	abstract	concepts.	For	instance,	we	might	ground	our	understanding	of	the	otherwise	
ineffable	concept	of	sadness	in	the	concrete	foundation	of	the	colour	blue.	Conceptual	
Metaphor	Theory	proposes	that	this	tendency	to	represent	abstract	concepts	through	
concrete	concepts	is	reflected	in	the	lexicon:	e.g.,	Because	the	colour	blue	grounds	our	
representation	of	sadness,	the	color	label	blue	has	been	extended	to	describe	sadness	as	
well.	
	
As	a	theory	of	concepts,	Conceptual	Metaphor	Theory	is	somewhat	unique:	More	standard	
theories	of	concepts	do	not	assume	that	abstract	concepts	are	metaphorically	structured	or	
constituted	in	terms	of	sensorimotor	primitives.	Instead,	other	theories,	like	Prototype	
Theory	(e.g.,	Hampton,	1995;	Rosch	&	Mervis,	1975),	Exemplar	theory	(Medin	&	Schaffer,	
1978),	and	Theory	theory	(Carey,	1985;	Gopnik	&	Meltzoff,	1997;	Murphy	&	Medin,	1985)	
assume	that	concepts	are	assembled	by	combining	more	basic	features	in	particular	ways:	
e.g.,	The	concept	of	chicken	might	be	built	by	combining	features	such	as	“has	feathers”,	
“found	on	farms”,	“lays	eggs”,	etc.	This	means	that,	unlike	Conceptual	Metaphor	theory,	
these	approaches	do	not	naturally	predict	the	existence	of	lexical	flexibility:	e.g.,	Because	
there	is	no	“grounding”	of	one	concept	in	terms	of	another	(e.g.,	sadness	in	color),	there	is	
no	reason	to	predict	that	two	concepts	will	share	the	same	label	(e.g.,	the	two	senses	of	
																																																						
2	Indeed,	in	some	languages,	the	animal-meat	pattern	is	marked	by	a	process	of	
compounding	(e.g.,	German	and	Japanese	compound	the	animal	name	with	their	language’s	
word	for	meat).	
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blue).	Nevertheless,	while	these	theories	may	not	provide	a	first-principles	explanation	for	
the	existence	of	lexical	flexibility,	they	do	generate	predictions	about	how	flexibility	should	
be	structured,	and	why	patterns	might	exist.	In	particular,	word	senses	could	be	extended	
based	on	overlap	in	important	conceptual	features:	For	example,	each	of	the	different	
senses	of	chicken	could	share	features	with	the	core	sense	that	refers	to	the	animal.	Under	
this	approach,	patterns	of	lexical	flexibility	emerge	because	similar	pairs	of	concepts	are	
related	in	similar	ways;	that	is	to	say,	chicken	meat	is	to	a	chicken	animal,	as	turkey	meat	is	
to	a	turkey	animal	(see,	for	examples,	Nunberg,	1979;	Papafragou,	1996;	Wilson,	2003).	
	
Regardless	of	their	different	approaches	toward	concepts,	the	different	theories	described	
above	each	predict	that,	so	long	as	members	of	different	cultures	share	similar	concepts,	
lexical	flexibility	should	also	be	similar	across	different	languages.	Because	patterns	of	
lexical	flexibility	reflect	important	properties	of	conceptual	structure,	the	same	patterns	
should	appear	across	different	languages.	As	we	discuss	below,	this	prediction	is	not	made	
so	strongly	under	conventionalization	accounts.		
	
The	most	radical	form	of	a	conventionalization	account	would	state	that	the	different	
senses	that	a	word	can	take	are	simply	arbitrary	conventions	that	speakers	must	learn.	But	
this	account	is	a	non-starter,	since	word	senses	are	clearly	not	arbitrary	but	are	instead	
related	to	one	another	in	systematic	patterns.		However,	one	possibility	is	that	these	
systematic	patterns	arise	via	analogy.	For	example,	Murphy	(2007)	speculates	that	the	
animal	and	meat	senses	of	chicken	first	entered	English	as	conventions,	and	that	their	
presence	provided	a	basis	for	coining	analogous	senses	(e.g.,	rather	than	invent	a	new	word	
for	the	meat	sense	of	turkey,	adults	coined	a	new	sense	by	analogy	to	chicken).		
	
If	patterns	of	lexical	flexibility	result	from	analogies	about	conventionalized	senses,	then	we	
might	expect	that	different	patterns	would	arise	in	different	languages,	depending	on	which	
senses	get	coined	first	in	each	language.	For	example,	the	animal	for	meat	pattern	may	have	
arisen	in	English	because	the	senses	of	chicken	became	a	part	of	the	language,	but	different	
events	could	have	unfolded	in	other	languages.	In	sum,	the	conventionalization	account	
predicts	that	different	patterns	of	flexibility	should	be	found	in	different	languages,	while	
the	conceptual	accounts	reviewed	above	predict	that	patterns	of	flexibility	should	be	similar	
across	languages.	
	
To	test	these	predictions,	Srinivasan	and	Rabagliati	(2015)	investigated	whether	twenty-
seven	patterns	of	flexibility	found	in	English	(such	as	the	patterns	in	Table	1)	were	also	
found	in	fourteen	other	languages	(Cantonese,	Farsi,	French,	Hindi,	Hungarian,	Indonesian,	
Italian,	Japanese,	Korean,	Mandarin,	Russian,	Spanish,	Turkish	and	Vietnamese).	Bilingual	
participants	rated	whether	translation-equivalents	of	English	flexible	words	showed	the	
same	flexibility	in	their	native	languages.	For	example,	participants	were	asked	to	translate	
the	wordform	that,	in	their	language,	referred	to	the	animal	chicken,	and	then	were	asked	
to	rate	whether	that	same	wordform	could	be	used	to	refer	to	chicken	meat.	These	
judgments	were	then	verified	and	augmented	with	dictionary	analyses.	We	found	evidence	
that	sixteen	of	the	assessed	patterns	were	exemplified	by	at	least	one	word	in	all	fourteen	
languages.	Of	the	remaining	eleven	patterns,	statistical	analyses	suggested	that	only	one	
was	absent	more	frequently	than	might	be	expected	due	to	chance	and	sampling	error.	
These	findings	provide	some	evidence	for	a	conceptual	view	of	lexical	flexibility,	by	
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suggesting	that	patterns	of	flexibility	recur	across	languages	–	even	across	quite	
typologically	distinct	languages.	
	
To	our	knowledge,	Srinivasan	and	Rabagliati	(2015)	is	the	only	large-scale	survey	of	patterns	
of	flexibility,	but	other	typological	work	has	also	provided	evidence	that	conceptual	
structure	helps	explain	lexical	flexibility.	For	example,	Viberg	(1983)	surveyed	flexible	uses	
of	verbs	of	perception	across	52	languages,	and	discovered	a	hierarchy	in	how	verbs	from	
one	modality	(sight,	hearing)	are	extended	to	refer	to	other	modalities	(taste,	touch),	more	
often	than	the	reverse.	As	an	example,	the	Italian	verb	sentire	can	refer	to	acts	of	hearing	
(sentire	il	concerto	[to	hear	the	concert])	and	acts	of	feeling	(sentire	dolore	[feel	pain]).	This	
sensory	hierarchy	in	lexical	flexibility	has	motivated	claims	about	how	different	senses	
dominate	one	another,	outside	of	language.	Additional,	smaller-scale	typological	work	is	
reviewed	in	Srinivasan	and	Rabagliati	(2015).	
	
The	robust	cross-linguistic	presence	of	patterns	of	flexibility,	such	as	animal-for-meat	or	
material-for-artifact,	is	consistent	with	the	conceptual	approach.	However,	there	is	also	
evidence	for	cross-linguistic	variability	in	the	specific	words	that	instantiate	these	patterns	
(Srinivasan	and	Rabagliati,	2015).	Some	patterns	of	flexibility,	like	the	material-for-object	
pattern,	are	instantiated	in	quite	different	ways	across	languages:	The	Russian	word	for	
glass,	for	example,	is	not	used	to	describe	cups,	but	is	instead	used	to	describe	car	windows.	
Such	variability	is	also	often	present	in	metaphorical	patterns,	such	as	in	how	names	for	
body	parts	like	head	or	arm	are	extended	to	label	other	kinds	of	objects.	This	cross-linguistic	
variability	suggests	that	lexical	flexibility	only	reflects	a	bird’s-eye	view	of	conceptual	
structure.	That	is	to	say,	conceptual	structure	may	provide	constraints	on	which	patterns	of	
flexibility	are	present	in	languages,	but	does	not	provide	tight	controls	on	the	manner	in	
which	those	patterns	are	lexicalized.	Thus,	although	the	meanings	of	flexible	words	are	
subject	to	cognitive	constraints,	they	are	also	conventions	that	reflect	a	society’s	
communicative	needs.	
	
However,	not	all	patterns	of	lexical	flexibility	are	instantiated	across	languages	in	variable	
ways.	For	example,	many	languages	use	names	for	animals	to	refer	to	their	meat,	and	use	
names	for	media	(video,	book,	newspaper,	etc.)	to	refer	to	their	contents	(the	hour-long	
video).	This	suggests	either	that	some	conventions	are	so	useful	that	they	are	required	by	all	
cultures,	or,	perhaps	more	plausibly,	that	some	patterns	place	tighter	constraints	on	which	
senses	can	plausibly	be	coined.	Consider,	for	instance,	the	material-for-object	pattern.	
Knowing	that	a	material	word	could,	in	principle,	refer	to	any	object	made	out	of	that	
material,	does	not	help	in	predicting	exactly	which	object	will	have	that	label	(for	example,	
in	English,	glass	cannot	be	used	to	label	vases,	jars,	etc.),	and	this	is	reflected	in	cross-
linguistic	variation.	By	contrast,	knowing	that	an	animal’s	name	should	be	associated	with	
its	meat	provides	a	tight	constraint	on	how	that	name	should	be	used,	as	there	is	typically	
only	one	type	of	meat	associated	with	each	type	of	animal.	
	
1.2	Explaining	generalization	
	
The	second	key	feature	of	lexical	flexibility	is	its	productivity:	For	some	patterns	of	flexibility,	
it	is	much	easier	to	coin	novel	senses	than	for	other	patterns.	For	instance,	patterns	like	
animal-for-meat	can	easily	be	extended	(John	ate	stewed	wildebeest),	but	other	patterns,	
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like	material-for-object,	are	more	difficult	to	extend	(John	bought	a	carbon).	Srinivasan	and	
Rabagliati	(2015)	argued	that	such	differences	in	generalizability	are	determined	by	the	
same	factors	that	determine	whether	a	pattern	will	show	variation	in	its	cross-linguistic	
instantiation.	That	is,	the	same	factors	that	explain	why	the	possible	senses	of	glass	vary	
across	languages	also	explain	why	it	is	hard	to	coin	novel	senses	for	the	material-object	
pattern.	
	
Cross-linguistic	comparisons	provide	evidence	for	this.	Srinivasan	and	Rabagliati’s	(2015)	
survey	uncovered	a	robust	correlation	between	whether	a	pattern	of	flexibility	permits	
generalization,	and	whether	that	pattern	shows	variability	across	languages:	The	difference	
between	the	animal-for-meat	and	material-for-object	patterns	we	have	discussed	–	in	terms	
of	both	generalization	and	cross-linguistic	variability	–	holds	up	for	a	large	range	of	patterns.	
Thus,	it	is	possible	to	predict	a	Russian	speaker’s	willingness	to	coin	a	novel	sense	for	a	
pattern	from	knowing	whether	that	pattern	shows	a	high	or	low	degree	of	cross-linguistic	
variability.	
	
One	way	to	explain	these	data	is	to	assume	that	patterns	like	animal-for-meat	are	
semantically	transparent,	such	that	it	is	relatively	easy	for	speakers	to	see	how	different	
exemplars	of	the	pattern	are	equivalent.	This	transparency	allows	them	to	form	
generalizations	about	those	words	–	e.g.,	that	words	that	can	label	animals	can	also	label	
their	meat	–	and	use	these	generalizations	to	create	novel	senses.	In	contrast,	it	might	be	
more	difficult	for	speakers	to	form	generalizations	about	words	that	follow	less	regular	
patterns,	like	material-for-object.	As	discussed	in	the	next	section,	these	generalizations	
could	be	represented	as	lexical	rules	and	allow	speakers	to	infer	new	senses	without	
receiving	direct	evidence	for	their	existence.	In	this	way,	they	would	act	similarly	to	
morphological	rules,	e.g.,	-y	suffixation:	e.g.,	Speakers	could	infer	that	wildebeest	(animal)	
can	become	wildebeest	(meat)	in	the	same	way	that	they	can	infer	that	wildebeest	(animal)	
becomes	wildebeesty	(trait).	The	distinction	between	patterns	of	flexibility	that	do	and	do	
not	permit	generalizations	could	thus	be	similar	to	the	distinction	between	morphological	
affixes	that	are	productive	and	affixes	that	are	non-productive.	
	
However,	an	alternative	interpretation	is	that	the	ability	to	coin	new	word	senses	does	not	
depend	on	having	formed	generalizations	about	patterns,	but	instead	on	whether	speakers	
can	perceive	a	semantic	relationship	between	the	original	word	sense	and	the	new	sense.	
This	is	similar	to	the	idea	encountered	earlier	in	the	chapter,	i.e.,	that	the	different	senses	of	
a	word	follow	from	conceptual	organization.	For	example,	Nunberg	(1979,	2004)	argues	that	
new	word	senses	can	be	coined	whenever	the	new	sense	stands	in	a	“noteworthy”	
relationship	to	an	existing	sense		(for	related	proposals	see	Falkum,	2015;	Papafragou,	1996;	
Wilson,	2003)).	Thus,	the	editor	of	a	handbook	might	say	The	words	senses	chapter	has	
asked	for	a	deadline	extension,	in	order	to	refer	to	the	authors	of	the	chapter	on	word	
senses.		
	
Although	Nunberg’s	proposal	is	interesting,	the	evidence	to	date	suggests	that	it	is	not	a	
correct	account	of	pattern-based	generalization	(though	it	may	explain	more	idiosyncratic	
word	uses).	In	particular,	Rabagliati,	Marcus	and	Pylkkänen	(2011)	found	that	acceptability	
judgments	of	word	senses	were	better	explained	by	patterns	of	flexibility	than	by	metrics	of	
conceptual	structure	(e.g.,	similarity,	relatedness,	etc.).	In	their	study,	participants	rated	
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whether	the	meaning	of	one	word,	such	as	DVD,	could	be	changed	to	refer	to	the	meaning	
of	another	word,	such	as	movie,	and	vice	versa.	Independent	sets	of	participants	then	rated	
whether	DVDs	were	related	to	movies,	whether	movies	were	related	to	DVDs,	whether	
DVDs	were	similar	to	movies,	whether	movies	were	similar	to	DVDs,	and	so	forth.	
Interestingly,	these	metrics	were	poor	predictors	of	the	acceptability	of	different	word	
senses,	contra	the	approach	suggested	by	Nunberg.	Instead,	participants’	judgments	were	
best	explained	by	their	adherence	to	specific	patterns:	e.g.,	names	for	media	(DVDs,	books,	
newspapers,	etc)	were	easily	able	to	stand	for	their	contents	(movies,	stories,	information)	
and	not	vice	versa,	no	matter	how	related	or	unrelated	participants	judged	the	two	things	
(media	and	contents)	to	be.		
	
Together,	the	typological	and	experimental	data	presented	in	this	section	indicate	that	
patterns	of	flexibility	have	a	large	influence	on	the	lexicon:	They	are	predictive	of	variability	
in	whether	word	senses	are	constrained	across	languages,	and	variability	in	how	readily	
novel	senses	can	be	coined.	But	how	might	patterns	be	represented	in	the	lexicon,	and	are	
more	generative	and	less	generative	patterns	represented	in	similar	ways?		
	
2.	Lexical	representation	of	word	senses	
	
Historically,	psychological	theories	of	lexical	representation	have	posited	two	types	of	
words:	1)	A	large	set	of	unambiguous	words,	defined	as	each	having	only	one	meaning,	and	
2)	A	smaller	set	of	homophones,	defined	as	each	having	multiple,	unrelated	meanings.	
Under	these	theories,	the	lexicon	is	assumed	to	consist	of	a	set	of	form-meaning	mappings,	
with	most	forms	associated	with	a	single	meaning,	and	a	small	set	of	forms	associated	with	
multiple	meanings	(and,	perhaps,	some	meanings	associated	with	multiple	synonymous	
forms).	However,	it	has	been	clear	for	some	time	that	such	an	account	of	the	lexicon	–	often	
referred	to	as	a	sense	enumeration	lexicon	–	is	a	gross	over-simplification.	
	
A	sense	enumeration	lexicon	ignores	not	only	the	fact	that	most	words	are	flexible	and	have	
multiple	related	meanings,	but	also	that	speakers	can	coin	and	understand	new	word	senses	
in	ways	that	generalize	from	existing	patterns	(see	prior	section).	Thus,	just	as	speakers	
know	that	chicken,	duck,	and	lamb	can	describe	both	an	animal	and	its	meat,	they	can	
understand	that	“a	plate	of	wildebeest”	refers	to	wildebeest	meat,	rather	than	the	animal	
itself.	This	suggests	that	the	lexicon	contains	multiple,	systematic	form-meaning	mappings	
for	many	words,	and	also	contains	mechanisms	for	generating	novel	senses.	What	types	of	
representational	structures	and	processes	might	explain	these	properties	of	the	lexicon?	
	
One	approach	has	been	to	augment	standard	theories	of	the	lexicon	with	generative	“lexical	
rules”,	akin	to	morphological	or	syntactic	rules,	which	generate	novel	word	senses	when	
they	are	applied	to	existing	words.	First,	the	lexicon	is	assumed	to	contain	a	large	store	of	
“irregular”	ambiguous	words:	Mappings	between	forms	and	meanings	that	cannot	be	easily	
predicted	by	a	rule,	and	thus	must	be	learned.	Second,	and	alongside	these	stored	pairings,	
are	a	relatively	small	set	of	lexical	rules	that	transform	word	meanings	in	a	principled	
fashion	(Borer,	2005;	Copestake	&	Briscoe,	1995;	Pustejovsky,	1995).	Such	rules	generate	
the	“regular”	senses	of	words	(e.g.,	chicken,	lamb,	etc.),	and	so	reduce	the	need	to	store	
redundant	information	in	the	lexicon.	They	also	provide	a	mechanism	that	allows	new	word	
meanings	to	be	coined	and	comprehended	(e.g.,	plate	of	wildebeest)	with	minimal	difficulty.		
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How	might	the	patterns	of	flexibility	discussed	before	–	e.g.,	animal-for-meat	and	material-
for-object	–	be	represented	within	this	view	of	the	lexicon?	One	possibility	is	that	all	
patterns	are	supported	by	lexical	rules,	such	that	the	patterns	themselves	are	specifically	
represented	in	the	lexicon.	However,	this	theory	faces	difficulty,	because	it	assumes	that	
generative	forms	of	flexibility	(e.g.,	animal-for-meat)	will	be	represented	in	the	same	
fashion	as	non-generative	forms	(e.g.,	material-for-object).		As	we	discuss	below,	this	
assumption	appears	to	be	incorrect.	Instead,	we	argue	that	only	generative	patterns	of	
flexibility	are	represented	by	lexical	rules,	and	that	the	senses	that	follow	non-generative	
patterns	must	be	stored.		
	
Under	the	approach	we	favour,	conceptual	biases	can	be	thought	of	as	prior	beliefs	about	
how	words	are	likely	to	be	used.	These	beliefs	guide	the	creation	of	an	optimally	structured	
lexicon:	One	that	both	stores	word	senses	that	are	hard	to	predict,	and	employs	lexical	rules	
to	represent	and	generate	predictable,	regular	senses,	obviating	the	need	to	store	these	
senses.	Under	this	account,	lexical	rules	reflect	conceptual	relations	but	are	still	distinct	
from	them,	in	the	same	way	that	morphological	rules	are	distinct	from	conceptual	relations,	
even	though	morphological	rules	reflect	conceptually-important	distinctions.		
	
Critically,	this	approach	to	lexical	structure	assumes	an	important	representational	
difference	between	generative	“regular”	flexibility,	where	a	word’s	senses	are	generated	by	
lexical	rules,	and	non-generative	“irregular”	flexibility,	where	a	word’s	senses	are	stored.	
Considerable	experimental	evidence	now	supports	this	distinction,	although	some	caveats	
remain.	This	distinction	makes	two	key	experimental	predictions.	First,	because	the	senses	
of	“irregular”	flexible	words	are	separately	stored,	in	much	the	same	way	as	the	meanings	
of	homophones	(e.g.,	“baseball	bat”	and	“animal	bat”),	irregular	senses	and	homophonous	
meanings	should	rely	on	very	similar	mechanisms	and	processes	for	access	and	use.	By	
contrast,	because	the	senses	of	“regular”	flexible	words	are	generated	through	rules,	the	
representations	and	mechanisms	that	are	used	for	processing	these	senses	should	be	very	
different	from	those	used	for	processing	homophones	and	irregular	flexible	words.		
	
Evidence	for	this	distinction	between	“regular”	and	“irregular”	flexible	words	has	come	from	
a	variety	of	different	paradigms.	Some	of	the	earliest	work	examined	how	such	words	are	
processed	in	context,	based	on	a	long-standing	result	in	the	psycholinguistics	literature:	
When	homonymous	words	are	read	in	unconstraining	contexts,	readers	tend	to	default	to	
the	most	frequent	interpretation	of	that	word	(e.g.,	the	“toy”	meaning	of	the	word	ball	is	
more	likely	than	the	“party”	meaning).	This	effect	has	been	demonstrated	as	follows.	If	the	
context	after	an	ambiguous	word	suggests	its	less-frequent	meaning	(e.g.,	the	“party”	
meaning	of	ball),	this	causes	a	slowdown	in	participants’	reading	speeds	(a	disambiguation	
effect,	which	can	be	measured	via	eye-tracking).	Similarly,	if	prior	context	before	an	
ambiguous	word	suggests	its	less	frequent	meaning,	then	participants	will	be	slower	to	read	
that	word,	compared	to	when	the	context	suggests	its	more	frequent	meaning	(a	so-called	
subordinate	bias	effect).	
	
Interestingly,	studies	employing	these	paradigms	have	suggested	that	some	flexible	words	
may	be	represented	and	processed	similarly	to	homophones	such	as	ball	(Foraker	&	
Murphy,	2012),	while	other	flexible	words	may	be	represented	and	processed	differently	
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than	homophones	(Frazier	&	Rayner,	1990;	Frisson,	2009;	Frisson	&	Pickering,	1999).	For	
example,	Frazier	and	Rayner	(1990)	found	that	the	disambiguation	effect	was	strongly	
reduced	for	flexible	words	like	newspaper	or	book,	compared	to	homonymous	words	such	
as	ball	or	bat.	Similarly,	Frisson	and	Pickering	(1999)	found	that	the	subordinate	bias	effect	
was	reduced	for	words	that	follow	the	place	name	for	event	pattern,	such	as	the	use	of	
Vietnam	to	refer	to	the	war	in	Vietnam.	In	contrast,	Foraker	and	Murphy	(2012)	found	large	
disambiguation	effects	for	other	flexible	words,	suggesting	that	their	senses	may	be	
represented	and	processed	similarly	to	distinct	and	unrelated	homophones.	Critically,	a	
major	difference	between	these	studies	was	the	flexible	words	that	were	used	as	stimuli:	
Frazier	and	Rayner,	and	Frisson	and	Pickering,	used	productive	patterns	of	lexical	flexibility,	
while	Foraker	and	Murphy	used	a	variety	of	words	drawn	from	multiple	patterns,	many	of	
which	were	not	productive.	Thus,	taken	together,	the	findings	suggest	that	the	senses	of	
regular	flexible	words	and	the	senses	of	irregular	flexible	words	are	represented	in	different	
ways,	with	irregular	flexible	words	represented	similarly	to	homophones.	
	
Priming	studies	provide	further	evidence	for	this	distinction.	If	word	senses	are	stored	
separately,	then	the	use	of	one	sense	should	not	prime	access	to	the	other	sense,	but	if	one	
sense	is	generated	from	the	other	sense,	then	they	should	prime	each	other.	Using	the	
same	set	of	flexible	words	as	Foraker	and	Murphy	(2012),	Klein	and	Murphy	(2001)	found	
that	participants	were	faster	to	process	simple	phrases	when	they	were	primed	by	phrases	
using	the	same	sense,	and	slower	when	the	sense	was	switched;	For	instance,	polluted	
atmosphere	primes	thin	atmosphere,	but	inhibits	the	processing	of	tense	atmosphere.	
Importantly,	Klein	&	Murphy	found	similarly-sized	effects	for	flexible	words	and	
homophones,	consistent	with	the	idea	that	these	(mostly	irregular)	flexible	words	are	stored	
as	separate	and	unrelated	words.	Complementary	work	by	Klepousniotou,	Titone	and	
Romero	(2008),	however,	has	suggested	that	for	other	flexible	words,	different	senses	do	
prime	one	another:		They	found	that	the	sense-switching	effect	was	greatly	reduced	for	
flexible	words	whose	senses	had	a	strong	semantic	relationship,	and	these	words	were	
almost	uniformly	“regular”	(e.g.,	young/juicy	chicken).	
	
However,	these	priming	studies	should	be	interpreted	with	caution:	It	is	unclear	whether	
they	indicate	a	true	representational	distinction	between	types	of	words,	or	instead	
differences	in	semantic	associations	between	phrases.	For	example,	while	the	word	polluted	
in	polluted	atmosphere	has	a	strong	association	with	the	gaseous	sense	of	atmosphere,	it	
has	very	little	association	with	the	social	sense	of	atmosphere.	By	contrast,	the	word	young	
in	“young	chicken”	has	a	strong	association	with	not	only	the	animal	sense	of	chicken,	but	is	
also	reasonably	associated	with	the	meat	sense	of	chicken.	Thus,	for	words	like	chicken,	the	
cost	of	switching	senses	may	be	reduced	by	associative	priming.	This	potential	influence	of	
semantic	associations	makes	it	difficult	to	say	whether	or	not	previous	priming	effects	
indicate	representational	distinctions	amongst	types	of	lexical	flexibility	(Klepousniotou,	
Pike,	Steinhauer,	&	Gracco,	2012;	MacGregor,	Bouwsema,	&	Klepousniotou,	2015).	
	
Thankfully,	evidence	for	a	regular-irregular	distinction	holds	under	other	paradigms.	
Rabagliati	and	Snedeker	(2013)	used	a	simple	referential	communication	task,	modeled	
after	Ferreira,	Slevc	and	Rogers	(2005),	who	had	discovered	that	when	participants	are	
asked	to	produce	descriptions	of	target	pictures	surrounded	by	distractors,	they	provide	
informative	descriptions	when	targets	and	distractors	depict	the	same	type	of	thing	(e.g.,	if	
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both	depicted	chicken	animals,	the	target	might	be	called	large	chicken),	but	often	provide	
uninformative	descriptions	when	targets	and	distractors	depict	different	things	that	share	a	
homophonous	name	(e.g.,	if	an	animal	bat	and	baseball	bat	were	depicted,	the	target	might	
only	be	called	bat).	Ferreira	and	colleagues	interpreted	these	findings	to	suggest	that	
participants	do	not	notice	ambiguous	“bats”	because	homophonous	meanings	are	
represented	separately.	After	replicating	these	findings,	Rabagliati	and	Snedeker	showed	
that	participants	also	differentiate	between	regular	and	irregular	flexible	words.	For	regular	
flexible	words	like	chicken,	participants	provided	informative	descriptions	when	both	senses	
(i.e.,	a	chicken	animal	and	meat)	were	depicted	as	target	and	distractor,	and	to	the	same	
degree	that	they	did	when	the	target	and	distractor	depicted	the	same	type	of	thing	(e.g.,	
two	different	chickens).	By	contrast,	for	irregular	flexible	words	like	glass,	participants	often	
provided	uninformative	descriptions,	describing	a	glass	cup	as	glass	when	a	piece	of	glass	
acted	as	a	distractor,	similar	to	how	they	behaved	for	homophones.	Importantly,	
participants’	ability	to	produce	informative	descriptions	was	better	explained	by	the	
distinction	between	regular	and	irregular	flexibility	than	by	independent	ratings	of	whether	
the	senses	of	these	words	were	similar.	These	data	therefore	suggest	that	while	irregular	
senses	are	separately	stored,	regular	senses	are	generated	through	a	shared,	core	meaning.	
	
	
More	direct	evidence	for	the	existence	of	generative	mechanisms	comes	from	
developmental	work	by	Srinivasan	and	Snedeker	(2011;	2014).	They	used	a	novel	paradigm:	
Children	were	taught	words	from	a	“muppet	language”	that	labeled	one	sense	of	a	flexible	
word,	or	one	meaning	of	a	homophone	pair,	and	were	assessed	on	whether	they	would	be	
willing	to	extend	those	novel	words	to	label	the	other	sense	or	meaning.	For	instance,	Elmo	
might	label	the	physical	object	sense	of	the	regular	flexible	word	book	as	blicket,	or	label	the	
animal	meaning	of	the	homophone	bat	as	wug.	Interestingly,	4-	and	5-year-olds	in	this	study	
were	willing	to	extend	the	labels	of	flexible	words,	but	not	the	labels	of	homophones.	For	
example,	they	accepted	that	long	blicket	could	describe	a	long	story,	but	they	would	not	
accept	that	black	blicket	might	label	a	black	baseball	bat	(Srinivasan	&	Snedeker,	2011).	
More	impressively,	in	other	studies,	children	appeared	to	extend	the	senses	of	flexible	
words	in	a	spontaneous	and	automatic	fashion	(Srinivasan	&	Snedeker,	2014;	Srinivasan,	Al-
Mughairy,	Foushee	&	Barner,	2017).	One	study	has	focused	on	children’s	knowledge	of	
instrument-activity	flexibility.	For	example,	after	watching	a	video	in	which	a	character	was	
shoveling	some	sand,	and	hearing	the	novel	verb	dax	to	describe	it	(e.g.,	She	is	daxing	the	
sand),	children	spontaneously	assumed	that	dax	could	also	label	the	shovel	itself	(i.e.,	in	line	
with	flexible	instrument-activity	words	like	shovel,	hammer,	bicycle,	etc.).	In	particular,	after	
being	taught	the	verbal,	activity	sense	of	dax,	children	were	given	a	forced-choice	task,	
where	they	had	to	decide	whether	a	second	word,	kiv,	referred	to	the	shovel,	or	to	the	
sand.	Children	reliably	chose	the	sand,	suggesting	that	1)	they	spontaneously	assumed	that	
dax	referred	to	the	shovel,	and	2)	they	had	used	the	mutual	exclusivity	principle	(Markman	
&	Wachtel,	1988)	to	infer	that	kiv	must	therefore	refer	to	the	sand.	Further	studies	
indicated	that	children’s	spontaneous	generalization	between	senses	isn’t	limited	to	familiar	
words	like	shovel,	but	instead	extends	to	entirely	novel	words	that	label	novel	activities	and	
instruments	(Srinivasan,	Al-Mughairy,	Foushee	&	Barner,	2017).		
	
In	sum,	a	variety	of	experimental	data	supports	an	important	representational	distinction	
between	“regular”	flexible	words,	whose	senses	are	generated	through	lexical	rules,	and	
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“irregular”	flexible	words,	whose	senses	are	separately	stored,	just	like	homophonous	
meanings.	This	is	consistent	with	a	view	of	the	lexicon	in	which	word	meanings	are	
efficiently	represented	through	a	combination	of	storage	and	generative	mechanisms.	
	
The	storage	plus	generativity	account	does	contrast	with	some	other	accounts	of	how	
flexible	word	meanings	are	represented.	For	example,	Pylkkänen,	Llinas	and	Murphy	(2006)	
suggest	that,	while	the	senses	of	many	flexible	words	may	be	stored,	they	are	stored	in	a	
fundamentally	different	way	from	how	the	meanings	of	homophones	are	stored.	In	
particular,	senses	are	stored	inside	a	single	“root”	form	of	a	word,	while	homophonous	
meanings	are	stored	in	separate	roots.	As	evidence	for	this,	they	show	that	the	
neurophysiological	response	to	reading	a	word	differs	depending	on	whether	it	has	multiple	
senses	or	multiple	meanings.	However,	their	paradigm	used	both	irregular	and	regular	
flexible	words	as	stimuli,	and	so	it	remains	possible	that	this	effect	was	only	driven	by	the	
regular	flexible	words.	
	
A	quite	different	account	comes	from	Rodd,	Gaskell	and	Marslen-Wilson	(2004),	who	
describe	a	connectionist	model	of	lexical	representations	in	which	the	forms	of	words	are	
linked	to	their	meanings	via	a	connectionist	network.	The	model	is	interesting	because	it	
does	not	draw	a	distinction	between	storage	and	productive	generalization,	in	analogous	
fashion	to	connectionist	models	of	inflectional	morphology	(McClelland	&	Patterson,	2002).	
Instead,	it	learns	links	between	distributed	representations	of	a	word’s	phonetic	form,	and	
distributed	representations	of	its	meanings.	These	distributed	meaning	representations	
cause	the	network	to	behave	quite	differently	when	learning	about	flexible	words	and	when	
learning	about	homophones.	For	flexible	words,	whose	multiple	senses	overlap	in	terms	of	
features,	the	model	is	easily	able	to	learn	a	mapping	from	a	word’s	form	to	its	meanings.	For	
homophones,	whose	meanings	do	not	share	features,	it	is	harder	to	activate	a	stable	
semantic	representation,	because	its	two	meanings	have	very	distinct	patterns	of	activation,	
and	they	will	compete	more	strongly.	
	
Rodd	and	colleagues’	model	has	been	successfully	used	to	explain	a	surprising	finding	about	
how	quickly	people	access	the	meanings	of	flexible	words:	lexical	decision	times	are	
differentially	affected	by	the	number	of	flexible	senses	a	word	has,	as	opposed	to	its	
number	of	homophonous	meanings	(Rodd,	Gaskell,	&	Marslen-Wilson,	2002).	In	particular,	
while	decision	times	are	reduced	for	words	with	more	senses,	they	are	increased	for	words	
with	more	homophonous	meanings.	However,	this	experiment	did	not	distinguish	between	
regular	and	irregular	flexible	words,	and	so	it	is	possible	that	this	effect	was	driven	by	the	
presence	of	regular	flexible	senses.	
	
It	is	currently	unclear	whether	the	model	of	Rodd	and	colleagues	can	account	for	the	
various	other	findings	about	flexible	word	representations	discussed	so	far.	For	instance,	the	
model	does	not	have	an	obvious	mechanism	for	generalization;	indeed,	generalization	
outside	of	a	training	space	is	often	problematic	for	connectionist	models	(Marcus,	2001).	
Additionally,	when	training	their	model,	Rodd	and	colleagues	did	not	use	a	realistic	
approximation	of	the	similarity	structure	of	word	senses.	Instead,	they	assumed	that	all	of	a	
word’s	senses	are	random	deviations	from	a	single	core	meaning.	As	we	discuss	below,	
word	senses	tend	to	be	related	to	one	another,	rather	than	similar	to	each	other,	and	thus	
often	do	not	share	many	surface	features.	It	is	unclear	if	this	would	affect	the	ease	with	
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which	the	network	maps	between	form	and	meaning.	Nevertheless,	Rodd	and	colleagues’	
model	is	important,	and	suggests	how	clear	benefits	can	be	gained	from	explicit	
computational	modeling	of	theories.	Other	theories,	such	as	the	storage	plus	generativity	
model	that	we	have	discussed	so	far,	would	likely	accrue	additional	benefits	from	such	a	
well-specified	implementation	(see	O’Donnell,	2015,	for	a	possible	framework	in	which	such	
models	could	be	implemented).	
	
	
	
	
3.	Why	do	words	have	distinct	senses?	
Thus	far,	we	have	characterized	the	types	of	word	senses	that	exist	across	languages,	and	
how	these	senses	may	be	represented	in	the	lexicon.	Left	untouched,	however,	is	a	deeper	
problem:	why	does	natural	language	contain	lexical	flexibility	in	the	first	place?	After	all,	
lexical	ambiguity	is	typically	considered	problematic	for	other	types	of	languages,	such	as	
programming	languages.	Could	lexical	flexibility	be	a	useful	feature	of	natural	language?	We	
have	already	touched	on	one	potential	reason	for	the	existence	of	lexical	flexibility,	i.e.,	that	
it	may	reflect	conceptual	organization.	An	alternative	approach,	however,	takes	a	different	
tack,	and	emphasizes	that	lexical	flexibility	could	play	an	important	functional	role	in	making	
language	easier	to	process	and	to	learn.		
	
Functional	accounts	of	language	assume	that	linguistic	characteristics,	such	as	grammatical	
or	lexical	structure,	are	adaptations	that	are	sculpted	by	two	core	pressures,	communication	
and	learning	(Givón,	1995;	Kirby,	1999;	Regier	et	al.,	2015).	Pressures	from	communication	
arise	from	how	a	language	is	used	in	a	community.	Languages	face	pressures	to	be	
expressive	–	allowing	many	different	meanings	to	be	transmitted	–	and	also	face	pressures	
to	be	efficient:	in	an	optimal	language,	it	should	be	easy	to	express	any	meaning	(e.g.,	
expressions	should	be	concise),	and	hard	to	misinterpret	any	expression	(due,	for	instance,	
to	a	noisy	environment).	Meanwhile,	pressures	from	learning	derive	from	how	languages	
are	transmitted	to	new	members	of	a	community:	Languages	that	are	easier	to	learn	are	
more	likely	to	be	accurately	recovered	by	learners,	and	then	will	be	passed	down	to	new	
learners	in	turn.	
	
We	suggest	that	lexical	flexibility	is	likely	to	be	an	adaptation	to	both	the	pressures	of	
communication,	and	the	pressures	of	learning	(see	also	Regier	et	al.,	2015).	As	we	detail	
below,	either	pressure	alone	seems	unlikely	to	fully	explain	lexical	flexibility,	but	the	
prevalence	of	lexical	flexibility	can	be	explained	by	the	joint	action	of	these	two	pressures.	
Moreover,	the	more	precise	characteristics	of	word	sense	relations	–	why	words	have	the	
senses	that	they	do	–	may	be	explained	by	how	these	pressures	act	to	create	a	
communication	system	that	is	suitably	adapted	to	help	express	the	types	of	concepts	that	
adults	and,	especially,	language-learning	children	are	able	to	represent.	
	
	 3.1	Functional	pressures	and	lexical	flexibility	
Communicative	pressures	can	be	understood	in	terms	of	costs.	For	every	word	we	speak	or	
understand,	we	pay	a	small	cost.	This	cost	can	be	explicit,	such	as	the	metabolic	energy	
required	to	articulate	a	syllable	or	to	retrieve	a	word	from	memory.	Or,	it	can	constitute	a	
more	implicit,	opportunity	cost:	By	spending	our	time	producing	or	comprehending	words,	
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we	take	our	efforts	away	from	other,	potentially	more	important	tasks.	The	precise	costs	
involved	in	using	a	word	depend	upon	some	of	its	features.	For	example,	the	time	and	
energy	that	are	required	to	articulate	a	word	depend	upon	its	length,	while	the	time	and	
energy	required	to	retrieve	a	word	from	memory	depend	upon	its	frequency	of	use.	Given	
that	we	spend	so	much	of	our	lives	speaking	and	listening,	a	rational	response	to	these	costs	
would	be	to	develop	a	lexicon	that	minimizes	them.	
	
The	communicative	lexicon	hypothesis	(Piantadosi,	Tily,	&	Gibson,	2012)	argues	that	lexical	
ambiguity	is	one	manifestation	of	that	rational	response.	In	particular,	if	it	is	the	case	that	
speakers	and	listeners	prefer	words	that	are	short	and	frequent,	but	also	need	to	use	those	
words	to	communicate	a	variety	of	ideas,	then	one	solution	is	to	increase	the	number	of	
meanings	that	each	short	and	frequent	word	can	be	used	to	stand	for.	Such	ambiguity	might	
be	assumed	to	cause	confusion,	another	cost,	but	as	long	as	the	context	around	each	word	
is	sufficient	to	disambiguate	which	meaning	is	intended,	then	such	a	system	will	be	
communicatively	efficient.	Consistent	with	this,	Piantadosi	and	colleagues	found	that,	across	
languages,	words	that	are	shorter,	that	are	more	frequent,	and	that	tend	to	occur	in	
predictable	contexts	(which	will	make	them	easier	to	retrieve	from	memory)	also	tend	to	be	
associated	with	more	meanings.	
	
The	communicative	lexicon	hypothesis	is	important	and	interesting,	and	provides	a	plausible	
reason	for	the	prevalence	of	lexical	ambiguity.	However,	it	falls	short	of	providing	a	full	
explanation	of	why	lexical	flexibility	in	particular	is	so	commonplace	in	natural	language,	
because	it	incorrectly	predicts	that	flexible	words	should	be	less	prevalent	than	homophony.	
In	particular,	the	communicative	lexicon	approach	predicts	that	it	is	only	beneficial	for	
words	to	have	multiple	meanings	when	those	meanings	can	be	easily	resolved	from	context.	
Because	homophones	like	bat	have	very	distinct	meanings,	their	different	uses	tend	to	
occur	in	distinctive	and	informative	contexts;	as	such,	this	type	of	ambiguity	should	be	
commonplace,	because	ambiguity	resolution	will	be	easy.	Meanwhile	the	related	senses	of	
flexible	words,	like	chicken,	are	likely	to	occur	in	more	related	contexts,	precisely	because	
they	are	related,	and	the	more	subtle	differences	between	these	contexts	will	make	it	easier	
to	become	confused	about	which	sense	is	being	used.	However,	and	contrary	to	this	
prediction	of	the	communicative	lexicon	hypothesis,	flexible	words	are	far	more	prevalent	
than	homophones.	For	example,	Rodd	et	al	(2004)	report	that	in	the	English	Wordsmyth	
dictionary	(Parks,	Ray,	&	Bland,	1998),	7.4%	of	words	can	be	classified	as	homonyms,	while	
84%	of	words	can	be	classified	as	flexible.	
	
To	understand	why	lexical	flexibility	is	more	prevalent	than	homonymy,	it	may	be	useful	to	
consider	additional	pressures	on	the	evolution	of	the	lexicon	that	go	beyond	the	pressure	to	
transmit	information	quickly.	For	example,	language	learners	need	to	rapidly	acquire	their	
language’s	lexicon,	and	interlocutors	often	need	to	stretch	their	existing	lexicon	to	express	
new	ideas.	These	pressures	may	have	shaped	the	lexicon	over	time,	leading	multiple	senses	
to	be	packed	into	words	in	ways	that	minimize	the	costs	associated	with	learning	a	lexicon	
and	expressing	novel	ideas.	Such	costs	could	be	minimized	if	the	multiple	senses	of	a	word	
are	highly	associable	and	easy	for	learners	and	interlocutors	to	compute,	as	is	the	case	for	
flexible	words.		
	
For	example,	when	having	a	conversation,	speakers	may	find	it	easier	to	express	a	new	idea	
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by	re-using	an	existing	word	form	that	has	a	related	meaning	(which	may	already	be	
activated	by	the	context),	than	by	creating	an	entirely	new	word	with	that	meaning,	and	
listeners	should	find	it	easier	to	compute	a	new	intended	meaning	if	they	can	use	a	highly	
associated	existing	word	sense	to	constrain	their	interpretation.	Similarly,	children	may	find	
it	relatively	easy	to	learn	a	flexible	lexicon,	because	learning	a	label	for	one	concept	can	give	
the	child	a	cue	as	to	how	other	related	concepts	might	be	labeled.	By	contrast,	when	the	
lexicon	is	unambiguous	or	only	contains	homophones,	learning	the	label	for	one	concept	
provides	no	hint	as	to	how	other	concepts	should	be	labeled.	As	an	example,	consider	a	
child	who	has	learned	that	the	word	glass	is	used	to	describe	a	drinking	vessel.	If	that	child	
wanders	into	the	kitchen	after	a	glass	vase	has	shattered	on	the	floor,	then	they	may	be	
able	to	guess	what	is	being	referred	to	if	they	are	told	“don’t	go	near	the	glass!”	(referring	
to	the	material).	By	contrast,	if	the	two	senses	of	glass	used	different	labels	(e.g.,	“don’t	go	
near	the	dax!”),	then	children	would	need	to	rely	on	context	alone	in	order	to	determine	
what	was	being	referred	to.		
	
Consistent	with	the	idea	that	the	lexicon	has	been	shaped	by	the	demands	of	expressing	
and	learning	new	meanings,	recent	findings	suggest	that	words	have	developed	new	senses	
over	history	in	predictable	ways	(Xu,	Malt	&	Srinivasan,	2017;	Ramiro,	Malt,	Srinivasan	&	Xu,	
2017).	For	example,	drawing	on	an	historical	database	of	the	English	lexicon	that	dates	back	
a	millennium,	Ramiro,	Malt,	Srinivasan	&	Xu	(2017)	developed	computational	models	to	
predict	how	new	senses	of	a	word	have	“attached”	to	existing	senses	of	a	word	over	history,	
on	the	basis	of	semantic	relations	between	senses.	Strikingly,	these	models	were	able	to	re-
capitulate	the	order	in	which	word	senses	have	emerged	over	history	better	than	chance.	
Notably,	the	most	successful	model	at	explaining	the	historical	data	employed	an	algorithm	
known	as	chaining	(Lakoff,	1987),	which	ensures	that	novel	senses	develop	from	existing	
ones	that	are	closest	in	meaning	and	which	may	thus	minimize	the	collective	costs	
associated	with	expressing	and	learning	new	word	meanings.		
	
Lexical	flexibility	may	therefore	allow	interlocutors	and	learners	to	leverage	their	existing	
knowledge	of	how	speakers	use	words,	to	improve	their	odds	of	understanding	additional	
ways	in	which	speakers	use	words.	This	ability	will	be	useful	during	childhood,	when	the	
learner	is	first	establishing	their	lexicon,	and	also	later	on,	in	learning	words	for	newly	
invented	concepts.	For	example,	flexible	neologisms,	like	using	google	to	refer	to	searching	
the	internet,	may	well	have	spread	through	the	language	because	their	meaning	was	easy	to	
understand.	Similarly,	when	a	speaker	does	not	know	the	correct	label	for	a	concept	(e.g.,	a	
child	trying	to	express	the	term	for	glass	material,	or	an	adult	trying	to	label	“searching	the	
internet”),	then	they	can	use	flexibility	to	guess	what	label	they	should	use,	and	have	a	
reasonable	chance	of	either	producing	the	correct	form	(if	that	concept	does	indeed	have	a	
label)	or	being	understood	(if	that	concept	does	not	have	a	label,	see	Zhu,	2013;	Zhu	&	Malt,	
2014).	In	this	way,	flexibility	allows	learners	to	easily	understand	and	produce	new	senses.	
	
But	lexical	flexibility	also	provides	a	second,	perhaps	more	powerful	learning	mechanism.	
Not	only	does	flexibility	make	it	easier	to	guess	how	people	have	used	words,	it	also	allows	
the	learner	to	anticipate	how	people	might	use	words	flexibly	in	future.	In	particular,	
learners	who	have	realized	that	some	word	senses	participate	in	generative	patterns	can	
use	those	patterns	to	infer	additional	senses	without	ever	being	provided	with	direct	
evidence	for	those	senses.	For	example,	knowing	that	dax	labels	an	activity	the	learner	can	
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infer	that	dax	also	labels	the	instrument	that	enables	that	activity.	Indeed,	the	studies	
described	before	by	Srinivasan	&	Snedeker	(2013)	and	Srinivasan,	Al-Mughairy,	Foushee	&	
Barner	(2017)	provide	evidence	that	young	children	can	spontaneously	infer	new	senses,	
allowing	them	to	bypass	observational	learning.	
	
The	examples	above	show	how	the	relative	frequencies	of	flexibility	and	homophony	are	
better	justified	by	an	account	in	which	functional	pressures	come	from	both	communication	
and	learning,	rather	than	just	communication	alone.	In	particular,	functional	pressures	that	
come	from	communication	should	result	in	homophonous	lexicons,	which	we	rarely	find,	
but	the	addition	of	pressures	from	learning	should	result	in	flexible	lexicons,	which	we	do	
find.	In	fact,	this	account	even	predicts	the	types	of	word	senses	that	we	should	find	in	a	
well-adapted	language.	In	particular,	those	word	senses	should	be	related	enough	to	
facilitate	learning,	but	not	so	similar	that	they	result	in	confusion	and	misinterpretation	
during	communication.	
	
The	examples	of	flexibility	seen	in	this	chapter	appear	to	fit	that	description.	The	senses	of	
glass	for	example,	are	clearly	related	to	one	another	(there	is	an	obvious	link	between	the	
material	sense	of	glass	and	the	drinking	vessel	sense),	but	this	does	not	mean	that	they	are	
similar,	or	drawn	from	the	same	category	of	things.	A	drinking	glass	has	a	number	of	
characteristic	properties:	it	holds	liquid,	it	can	be	held	in	the	hand,	it	can	be	easily	balanced	
on	a	surface,	and	so	on.	The	material	sense	of	glass	has	none	of	these	properties.	Instead,	it	
is	a	brittle,	transparent	substance,	that	can	be	used	to	make	a	variety	of	distinct	artifacts	
(such	as	drinking	glasses).	Indeed,	many	flexible	words	appear	to	have	senses	that	are	
related	but	not	similar.	Klein	and	Murphy	(2001,	2002)	found	that	the	senses	of	flexible	
words	were	often	given	surprisingly	low	similarity	ratings,	and	that,	even	for	the	most	
similar	pairs	of	senses,	subjects	were	unwilling	to	classify	the	two	senses	as	describing	the	
same	type	of	thing.	Similarly,	Rabagliati	et	al	(2011)	found	that	relatedness,	rather	than	
similarity,	was	a	better	predictor	of	whether	two	plausible	word	senses	existed.3		
	
Behind	this	idea	is	the	implicit	assumption	that	related-yet-not-similar	word	senses	are	easy	
to	learn,	and	in	particular	are	easy	for	children	to	learn.	After	all,	the	majority	of	language	
learners	are	children.	For	this	theory	to	be	correct,	it	must	be	the	case	that	children	have	no	
difficulty	in	learning	word	senses	that	are	only	related	through	a	flexible	conceptualization	
(e.g.,	conceptualizing	glass	as	both	a	substance	and	an	artifact)	or	that	are	related	through	
an	abstract	link	(e.g.,	a	metaphorical	relation,	such	as	using	chicken	to	describe	a	
																																																						
3	We	should	note	that	similarity-based	flexibility	may	in	fact	occur	in	human	languages,	but	
that	this	type	of	ambiguity	tends	to	be	classified	as	vagueness.	Potential	examples	of	
borderline	flexible/vague	words	can	be	found	in	semantic	domains	for	which	detailed	cross-
linguistic	data	has	been	collected,	such	as	kinship	terms.	For	example,	in	English	the	word	
Aunt	is	used	to	label	the	sisters	of	your	parents,	but	other	languages	make	finer	grained	
distinctions:	e.g.,	Korean	distinguishes	maternal	aunts	(imo)	and	paternal	aunts	(gomo).	This	
suggests	that	the	English	Aunt	may	in	some	sense	be	polysemous,	even	if	it	is	not	classified	
as	such	by	English	lexicographers.	Unfortunately,	we	do	not	currently	have	a	good	method	
or	test	for	distinguishing	when	a	word	is	polysemous	from	when	a	word	is	vague,	apart	from	
the	existence	of	more	fine-grained	distinctions	in	other	languages.	As	such,	it	is	hard	to	
evaluate	this	possibility’s	explanatory	potential.	
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personality).	This	assumption	requires	investigation,	because	it	demands	that	young	
children	can	flexibly	reason	about	different	concepts,	e.g.,	to	understand	not	only	how	the	
different	senses	of	words	like	glass	are	related,	but	also	to	understand	how	these	word	
senses	are	distinct.	
	
	
3.2	Mechanisms	and	constraints	for	learning	senses	
	
Interestingly,	there	is	considerable	evidence	that	children	are	able	to	flexibly	reason	about,	
and	conceptualize,	objects,	individuals,	and	events	in	the	world	around	them,	even	before	
they	master	flexible	words.	For	example,	Gelman	and	Bloom	(2000)	demonstrated	that	3-
year-old	children	can	construe	the	same	object	as	an	intentionally	created	artifact,	or	as	a	
piece	of	material,	depending	on	what	background	information	they	are	given	about	that	
object.	For	instance,	they	will	label	a	sharp	piece	of	plastic	as	a	“knife”	if	told	that	the	plastic	
was	intentionally-shaped,	but	they	will	label	it	as	“plastic”	if	told	that	its	shape	arose	
accidentally.	Similarly,	two-year-old	children,	who	have	not	acquired	a	syntactic	mass/count	
distinction,	can	flexibly	switch	their	attention	between	shape	and	material	composition:	
When	dealing	with	solid	objects,	they	reason	that	shape	is	a	more	important	predictor	of	
kind	membership	than	material	composition,	and	vice	versa	when	dealing	with	substances	
(Soja,	Carey,	&	Spelke,	1991).	Finally,	children	are	able	to	reason	about	the	same	physical	
object	as	either	an	artifact	or	as	an	intentional	agent,	long	before	they	have	mastered	
intentional	language,	or	even	multi-word	syntax.	For	instance,	12-month-old	infants	will	
follow	the	“gaze”	of	a	faceless	object	if	that	object	interacts	with	them	by	contingently	
reacting	to	their	own	movements	and	vocalisations	(Johnson,	Slaughter,	&	Carey,	1998).	
These	data,	and	many	other	reports,	support	the	idea	that	children	make	sense	of	the	world	
through	a	small	set	of	“framework	theories”	that	allow	them	to	explain	observed	properties	
of	the	world	in	different	ways	(Carey,	1985;	Gopnik	&	Meltzoff,	1997;	Keil,	1994).	For	
example,	these	framework	theories	would	allow	children	to	understand	chickens	in	terms	of	
their	form	(e.g.,	they	have	wings,	they	have	beaks),	in	terms	of	their	purpose	(e.g.,	they	are	
bred	for	eating),	or	in	terms	of	their	intentional	behavior	(e.g.,	they	are	cowardly).		
	
We	suggest	that	these	early-developing	cognitive	capacities	allow	children	to	learn	flexible	
words.	Indeed,	it	may	well	be	the	case	that	patterns	of	flexibility	(like	animal-for-meat)	are	
concrete	manifestations	of	how	children	apply	different	framework	theories	to	the	world,	in	
order	to	make	sense	of	coherent	superordinate	classes.	For	instance,	animal-for-meat	may	
reflect	children’s	ability	to	construe	animals	as	both	intentional	agents	and	substances.	An	
important	corollary	of	this	is	that	such	cognitive	biases	will	not	only	allow	children	to	learn	
certain	senses,	but	will	also	make	it	harder	for	children	to	learn	other	senses.	Indeed,	if	
children	were	not	constrained	in	which	kinds	of	word	senses	they	could	learn,	one	might	
expect	that	different	languages	would	develop	different	kinds	of	lexical	flexibility,	since	all	
forms	of	lexical	flexibility	could	be	learned	and	transmitted	across	generations.	But	the	
existence	of	cross-linguistic	regularities	in	flexibility	–	documented	by	Srinivasan	&	
Rabagliati	(2015)	–	suggests	that	this	cannot	be	the	case.		
	
Indeed,	there	is	evidence	for	an	important	interaction	between	children’s	cognitive	biases,	
their	ability	to	learn	novel	word	senses,	and	the	types	of	lexical	flexibility	that	are	found	
across	languages.	In	particular,	children’s	conceptual	biases	may	lead	them	to	be	better	at	
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learning	certain	types	of	word	senses	compared	to	others,	leading	these	more	learnable	
senses	to	be	more	frequent	across	different	languages.	The	best	evidence	for	this	idea	
comes	from	work	on	denominal	verbs.	Previous	work	has	identified	a	number	of	distinct	
classes	of	denominal	verbs	(Clark	&	Clark,	1979),	with	these	classes	partially	determined	by	
the	relationship	between	the	meaning	of	the	noun	and	the	thematic	role	structure	of	the	
derived	verb.	For	example,	denominal	verbs	like	water	or	butter	are	referred	to	as	“goal”	
verbs,	because	their	direct	objects	(water	the	garden,	butter	the	bread)	indicate	a	goal	for	
the	substance	denoted	by	the	noun	(water	is	placed	in	the	garden,	butter	is	placed	on	the	
bread).	By	contrast,	denominal	verbs	like	weed	or	milk	are	referred	to	as	“source”	verbs,	
because	their	direct	objects	(weed	the	garden,	milk	the	cow)	indicate	the	source	of	the	
substance	denoted	by	the	noun	(weeds	are	taken	from	the	garden,	milk	is	taken	from	the	
cow).		
	
Interestingly,	children	find	certain	classes	of	denominal	verbs	easier	to	learn	than	other	
classes,	and	this	is	consistent	not	only	with	children’s	cognitive	biases,	but	also	with	the	
typological	patterning	of	these	verb	classes.	In	particular,	English-learning	children	find	it	
more	difficult	to	learn	source	verbs	like	milk	or	weed,	than	to	learn	goal	verbs	like	water	or	
butter.	Srinivasan	&	Barner	(2013)	found	that	four-	and	five-year-olds	often	assume	that	
source	verbs	denote	the	transfer	of	a	substance	to	a	goal	–	e.g.,	such	that	“milk	the	cow”	
entails	putting	milk	onto	a	cow	–	and	do	so	even	when	they	understand	that	such	meanings	
are	implausible	(e.g.,	because	milk	comes	from	a	cow).	Moreover,	children	show	this	goal	
bias	not	simply	in	their	misinterpretations	of	familiar	verbs,	but	also	in	their	learning	of	
novel	verbs.		
	
This	bias	toward	learning	goal	verbs	may	reflect	a	broader	and	early-developing	cognitive	
bias	to	focus	on	goals.	It	is	well-established	that	a	cognitive	goal	bias	colours	children’s	
event	perception:	When	asked	to	describe	events	involving	an	agent	moving	from	a	source	
to	a	goal,	both	children	and	adults	are	more	likely	to	mention	the	goal	than	the	source	
(Lakusta	&	Landau,	2005,	2012).	Even	prelinguistic	infants	exhibit	a	goal	bias,	as	they	are	
more	accurate	in	detecting	changes	to	events	that	involve	goals,	as	opposed	to	sources	
(Lakusta,	Wagner,	O'Hearn,	&	Landau,	2007).	Although	it	has	not	been	proven	that	a	
nonlinguistic,	cognitive	goal	bias	causes	children	to	have	a	goal	bias	in	learning	denominal	
verbs,	the	coordination	of	these	two	biases	seems	unlikely	to	be	a	coincidence.	
	
Moreover,	and	consistent	with	the	broader	idea	that	easy-to-learn	senses	are	more	likely	to	
be	present	cross-linguistically,	source	verbs	appear	to	be	less	typologically	robust	than	goal	
verbs.	In	Srinivasan	and	Rabagliati’s	(2015)	cross-linguistic	survey	of	flexibility	(described	
before),	source	verbs	were	the	least	attested	across	different	languages,	and	were	the	only	
pattern	of	flexibility	that	was	absent	more	often	than	expected	due	to	sampling	error.	As	
such,	the	distinction	between	source	and	goal	verbs	–	in	how	they	are	learned	by	children,	
and	in	their	relative	presence	across	languages	–	provides	intriguing	evidence	for	the	idea	
that	children’s	learning	biases	shape	lexical	flexibility.	
	
Future	work	should	explore	whether	children	have	learning	biases	that	make	sense	of	other	
features	of	cross-linguistic	variation	in	lexical	flexibility.	For	example,	as	discussed	earlier,	
there	are	clear	patterns	in	whether	verbs	relating	to	one	sensory	modality	can	be	extended	
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to	describe	another	modality	or	not	(Viberg,	1983).	This	generates	predictions	about	
asymmetries	in	learnability	that	could	be	tested	in	the	future.		
	
4.	Discussion	
	
Why	do	words	have	the	senses	that	they	do?	In	this	chapter,	we	have	argued	that	the	
senses	of	flexible	words	can	be	understood	from	at	least	three	perspectives.	They	can	be	
understood	as	reflections	of	conceptual	biases	and	culture-specific	conventions,	as	
representations	in	the	mental	lexicon,	and	as	mechanisms	that	allow	languages	to	be	more	
learnable,	and	more	efficient	for	communication.	While	these	three	perspectives	are	in	
many	ways	independent,	they	also	interlink	in	important	ways.		
	
For	example,	we	have	argued	that	word	senses	are	culture-specific	conventions,	
constrained	by	conceptual	biases,	and	that	these	biases	have	their	roots	in	children’s	
earliest	cognitive	development.	We	began	this	chapter	by	discussing	the	existence	of	
patterns	of	flexibility	in	English,	of	which	there	are	many.	Across	many	languages	we	found	
that,	while	word	senses	may	vary,	which	indicates	that	senses	are	cultural	conventions,	
nevertheless	these	same	patterns	appear	to	recur	across	languages.	We	have	suggested	
that	these	patterns	may	reflect	the	flexible	ways	in	which	even	children	are	able	to	reason	
about	the	world.	For	example,	children’s	ability	to	flexibly	reason	about	form,	function,	or	
intention	could	allow	them	to	construe	individuals,	objects	or	events	in	multiple	different	
ways,	and	thus	to	understand	links	between	word	senses	that	are	related	but	not	similar.	
Under	this	proposal,	therefore,	the	same	intuitive	theories	that	explain	how	children	
acquire	concepts	might	explain	how	children	learn	about	the	meanings	of	flexible	words,	
and	thus	influence	which	patterns	of	flexibility	tend	to	recur	across	languages.	We	suggest	
that	patterns	of	lexical	flexibility	represent	the	outcome	of	applying	these	different	intuitive	
framework	theories	to	the	world,	in	order	to	make	sense	of	coherent	superordinate	classes.	
For	example,	the	animal-for-meat	pattern	may	reflect	children’s	ability	to	construe	the	
animals	as	both	agents	and	substances	(Johnson	et	al.,	1998),	while	the	material-for-artifact	
pattern	may	reflect	children’s	ability	to	reason	about	both	an	object’s	material,	and	its	
intended	form	(Soja	et	al.,	1991).	
	
As	another	example	of	how	different	perspectives	toward	lexical	flexibility	complement	one	
another,	we	have	argued	that	flexible	words	are	represented	as	a	combination	of	stored	
senses	and	generative	lexical	rules.	These	lexical	rules	are	important,	as	they	allow	children	
to	enlarge	their	expressive	vocabulary,	by	spontaneously	guessing	how	novel	concepts	
might	be	labeled	(e.g.,	on	learning	that	an	animal	is	called	a	dax,	children	can	guess	that	its	
meat	is	also	called	dax).	This	example	shows	how	a	consideration	of	the	potential	functions	
of	lexical	flexibility	(in	this	case,	helping	children	to	master	the	conventionalized	lexicon	of	
their	language)	can	provide	reasons	for	preferring	certain	models	of	how	words	are	
mentally	represented	over	others.	In	particular,	the	utility	(and	existence)	of	spontaneous	
generalization	in	young	children	suggests	that	their	lexicons	must	possess	mechanisms	for	
generating	new	senses,	such	as	lexical	rules.	
	
These	examples	suggest	that	a	broad	perspective	is	necessary	to	fully	understand	lexical	
flexibility	and	word	senses:	A	perspective	under	which	theories	are	examined	from	both	
structuralist	and	functionalist	perspectives,	and	where	data	is	gathered	from	a	variety	of	
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sources:	typological	investigation,	psycholinguistic	experiments,	and	developmental	studies.	
We	believe	that	this	type	of	broad,	interdisciplinary	approach	will	be	fruitful	in	elucidating	
other	facets	of	semantics	and	pragmatics	as	well.			
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